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The family and friends of Vintanga Kalidze, who was detained for five months without 
bail for disturbing the peace, gather in Kulidzele, Malawi on August 16, 2010. Kalidze’s 
wife had to sell their most valuable possessions, including a bike, radio, and their cows 
and goats, to afford to visit him in prison.
5About the Global Campaign 
for Pretrial Justice
Excessive and arbitrary pretrial detention1 is an overlooked form of human rights abuse 
that affects millions of persons each year, causing and deepening poverty, stunting 
economic development, spreading disease, and undermining the rule of law. Pretrial 
detainees may lose their jobs and homes; contract and spread disease; be asked to pay 
bribes to secure release or better conditions of detention; and suffer physical and psy-
chological damage that last long after their detention ends. In view of the magnitude 
of this worldwide problem, the Open Society Justice Initiative, together with other part-
ners, is in the process of launching a Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice. Its principal 
purpose is to reduce unnecessary pretrial detention and demonstrate how this can be 
accomplished effectively at little or no risk to the community.
The impact of indiscriminate and excessive use of pretrial detention is felt most 
sharply in the countries that are the focus of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). Key goals on child health, gender equality, and universal education are directly 
inhibited by the significant expense incurred and opportunity lost when someone is 
detained and damaged through pretrial detention.2 
Current activities of the Global Campaign include collecting empirical evidence 
to document the scale and gravity of arbitrary and unnecessary pretrial detention; build-
ing communities of practice and expertise among NGOs, practitioners, researchers and 
policy makers; and piloting innovative practices and methodologies aimed at finding 
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effective, low cost solutions. In addition, the campaign strives to establish linkages 
with associated fields such as broader rule of law and access to justice initiatives and 
programs.
The goal of this paper is to focus on an important and underappreciated issue and 
assist countries and governments to better understand it and more effectively design 
policy responses to it. Although this paper makes reference to specific situations and 
countries, it is important to note that excessive pretrial detention is a global issue affect-
ing developing and developed countries alike. 
This paper is part of a series of four papers examining the impact of excessive 
pretrial detention. In addition to the socioeconomic impact of pretrial detention, the 
papers in the series look at the intersection of pretrial detention and public health, 
torture, and corruption.
More information about the Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice is available at 
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/criminal_justice/articles_publications/
publications/pretrialjustice_20090903.
Summaries of the other three papers in this series are available as follows:
• Pretrial detention and torture: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/focus/
criminal_justice/articles_publications/publications/pretrial-detention-tor-
ture-20100409;
• Pretrial detention and public health: http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/
focus/criminal_justice/articles_publications/publications/pretrial-detention-
health;
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I. Introduction 
The decision to detain a person before he is found guilty of a crime is one of the most 
draconian a State or individual can make. A decision made in an instant by the arresting 
officer can have a severe, lasting, and adverse impact. Whether or not it is justified, and 
regardless of whether due process is followed, the arrest is likely to have a traumatic 
effect on the detainee and those who love and depend on him. Pretrial detention is one 
of the worst things that can happen to a person: the detainee immediately loses his 
freedom, and can also lose his family, health, home, job, and community ties. Moreover, 
pretrial detention does not reduce crime or improve public security. In fact, as discussed 
in Section II, excessive pretrial detention is more likely to increase criminality than 
deter it.
Summarily locking up millions of people who are presumed innocent is not only 
a violation of international norms, but also unnecessary.3 Most pretrial detainees pose 
no threat to society and should not be in detention. Many of those held in pretrial 
detention will have their charges withdrawn due to lack of evidence, while others will 
be acquitted at trial. Still others will be found guilty of minor, non-violent offenses for 
which jail time is inappropriate or for which the maximum sentence is less than the 
time spent awaiting trial.
The socioeconomic impact of excessive pretrial detention is profound, affecting 
not just the individuals detained, but their families, communities, and even States. As 
this report seeks to demonstrate, that impact is felt most keenly by the poor. The poor 
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are more likely to come into conflict with the law, more likely to be confined pending 
trial, and less able to afford the “three Bs” of pretrial release: bribe, bail, or barrister. 
On any given day, an estimated three million people are behind bars awaiting 
trial. In the course of a year, approximately 10 million people will pass through pretrial 
detention. Many will spend months and even years in detention—without being tried 
or found guilty—languishing under worse conditions than people convicted of crimes 
and sentenced to prison. It is important to bear in mind that pretrial detainees are pre-
sumed innocent in accordance with the most basic and universally-accepted notions of 
due process.
Many pretrial detainees are exposed to torture, extortion, and disease. They are 
subject to the arbitrary actions of police, corrupt officials, and even other detainees. 
Throughout their ordeal, most never see a lawyer or legal advisor and often lack infor-
mation on their basic rights. When they eventually reach trial—without representation 
and likely beaten down by months of confinement—the odds are stacked against them: 
persons in pretrial detention are more likely to be found guilty than defendants from 
similar backgrounds, facing similar charges, who are released awaiting trial.4 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has noted that empirical research 
shows those in pretrial detention have a lower likelihood of obtaining an acquittal than 
those who remain at liberty before their trial; this “deepens further the disadvantages 
that the poor and marginalized face in the enjoyment of the right to a fair trial on an 
equal footing.”5 In South Africa, for example, people held in custody before their trials 
were six times more likely to be sentenced to imprisonment than those released on 
bail.6
Pretrial detainees may lose their jobs, be forced to abandon their education, and 
be evicted from their homes. They are exposed to disease and suffer physical and psy-
chological damage that lasts long after their detention ends. Their families also suffer 
from lost income and forfeited education opportunities, including a multi-generational 
effect in which the children of detainees suffer reduced educational attainment and 
lower lifetime income. The ripple effect does not stop there: the communities and States 
marked by the over-use of pretrial detention also must absorb its socioeconomic impact. 
Around the world, excessive pretrial detention prods people toward poverty. It 
pushes working class people toward unemployment, uncertainty, and the edge of pov-
erty. It tips those on the edge of privation into poverty and plunges the already poor into 
even worse destitution. It limits the development of whole communities, wastes human 
potential, and misdirects State resources. 
These negative socioeconomic effects simply should not happen. Excessive and 
arbitrary pretrial detention is universally prohibited by international legal norms. In 
fact, though rational pretrial detention plays an important role in criminal justice sys-
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tems, it should—according to international norms—ordinarily be a last resort, used 
only under certain, specific conditions. The human rights standards governing pretrial 
detention are clear (as documented in Appendix 2); this report looks at the practical 
impact of the violation of those standards.
In exploring the socioeconomic impact of pretrial detention, this publication first 
provides an overview of pretrial detention, including its global scope, the many ills 
attendant to it, the particularly severe impact on the poor and marginalized, and the 
current state of research on the topic. The report then goes on to examine the many 
manifestations of pretrial detention’s socioeconomic impact, including the effects on 
individuals, families, communities, and States. The report concludes by offering rec-
ommendations, an appendix illustrating one attempt to calculate the monetary costs of 
pretrial detention in Mexico, an appendix compiling relevant international instruments 
governing the use of pretrial detention, and a bibliography.
This report is presented as a nascent effort to catalogue the socioeconomic impact 
of excessive pretrial detention around the world. As discussed in Section II, precise 
data on pretrial detention are rare. Rarer still are rigorous cost (or cost-benefit) analyses 
of pretrial detention. Although there are extant studies from Mexico (summarized in 
Appendix 1), Chile, Argentina, and Ukraine, the literature is thin. This report, then, may 
be seen as both an initial foray and an appeal for additional research.
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II. Overview of Pretrial Detention 
The Global Scope of the Problem
One way to measure the scope of pretrial detention is its duration—the number of days 
people spend in detention. According to a 2003 European Commission investigation, 
the average length of pretrial detention in 19 of the then 25 member states of the Euro-
pean Union was 167 days, or 5.5 months.7 Data for other countries or regions are hard to 
find, but the global average is almost certain to be higher than the European figure—for 
example, the average length of pretrial detention in Nigeria is 3.7 years.8
A second gauge of the extent of pretrial detention around the world is the total 
number of individuals in detention. While accurate and up-to-date data are not available 
for all countries, it is reliably estimated that worldwide, some three million people are in 
pretrial detention at any given time.9 That cohort would be larger than the populations 
of 60 countries, including Armenia, Congo-Brazzaville, and Jamaica.
Still, the three million-person snapshot of a given day’s pretrial detention popula-
tion does not adequately convey the real extent of pretrial detention around the world. 
A more dynamic measure is the flow of people into custody over time. In the course of 
a typical year, an estimated 10 million people will enter pretrial detention—a number 
greater than the populations of two-thirds of the world’s countries.10
A third important measure of pretrial detention is the percentage of all detainees 
who are in the pretrial stage: globally, one out of every three detainees is awaiting trial 
and has not been found guilty of a crime.11 
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A fourth way of measuring pretrial detention is the rate, calculated as the num-
ber of pretrial detainees per 100,000 of the general population. Globally, an estimated 
44 people per 100,000 are in pretrial detention, but this figure hides vast disparities 
among regions. The Nordic countries of Europe, for example, have a pretrial detention 
rate of 14 per 100,000, while North America’s rate is 137 per 100,000.12
The excessive and arbitrary use of pretrial detention is a global problem, affecting 
developed and developing countries alike. As the data on average duration of pretrial 
detention indicate, there is great variance among States in their use of pretrial deten-
tion. But while the problem is nearly universal, its manifestations are manifold and 
diverse. Some broad patterns tend to hold and can be useful in understanding the 
diversity and complexity of the issue.
Developed countries tend to have more total pretrial detainees as well as a higher 
pretrial detention rate. The United States, for example, has the world’s highest total 
number of pretrial detainees (approximately 476,000), and the fourth-highest rate of 
pretrial detention (158 per 100,000). But the average pretrial detention duration and the 
percentage of all prisoners who are pretrial are relatively low in the U.S. and throughout 
the developed world.
Conversely, in the developing world the rate of pretrial detention may be com-
paratively low, but the average duration and percentage of all prisoners who are pretrial 
are relatively high. In some countries, over three quarters of all prisoners are pretrial 
detainees. This includes Liberia (where 97 percent of all prisoners are awaiting trial), 
Mali (89 percent), Benin (80 percent), Haiti (78 percent), Niger (c.76 percent), Bolivia 
(74 percent), and Congo-Brazzaville (c. 70 percent). 
Pretrial detention can provide a window into the effectiveness and efficiency of a 
particular State’s criminal justice system, as well as its commitment to the rule of law. In 
the developed world, the lower percentage of all prisoners who are pretrial and the shorter 
average duration of pretrial detention indicate a relatively efficient criminal justice sys-
tem: people move through the system quickly and are generally released pending trial. In 
developing countries, however, the great majority of all detainees are pretrial and they can 
languish in that situation for years. This indicates, at best, an inefficient and overwhelmed 
criminal justice system, and at worst a lack of commitment to the rule of law.
The Negative Effects of Excessive Pretrial Detention
Many bad outcomes stem from the global over-use of pretrial detention. Excessive pre-
trial detention shatters individual lives, destroys families, and degrades communities. 
It also undermines the rule of law—by fostering corruption and encouraging criminal-
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ity—and exposes people presumed innocent to torture, disease, and overcrowding in 
conditions worse than most sentenced prisoners experience.
Arbitrary and Wasteful
Under international standards, people awaiting trial should generally be allowed to 
return to their communities on condition that they respect the law and appear for trial 
on a set date. Only in certain circumstances should individuals be detained pending 
trial. There must be reasonable grounds to believe the person committed the alleged 
offense and a genuine risk of the person absconding, posing a danger to the community, 
or interfering with the course of justice. Aside from being a recognized international 
requirement, allowing suspects to return to their communities reduces the scope for 
mistreatment and enables them to mount a more effective defense. Also, it should 
be noted that releasing people who are awaiting trial does not usually threaten public 
safety: as discussed in Section V, there are many means available to secure their compli-
ance while at liberty, all of which are less costly than pretrial detention.
Too many countries, however, cannot or do not comply with these standards. 
Excessive and/or arbitrary use of pretrial detention contributes to the chronic, costly, 
and counterproductive overcrowding of detention facilities. A more rational use of pre-
trial detention would enable governments to reduce overcrowding and channel associ-
ated costs into crime prevention, legal aid, and education.
Undermining the Rule of Law
The rule of law is fundamental to all open societies. It is also an important aspect of 
socioeconomic development.13 Excessive pretrial detention undermines the rule of law 
by debasing the presumption of innocence, furthering corruption, and even promoting 
criminality.
If a defendant is ordered held in custody, or if money bail is set at an amount 
the defendant cannot meet, several significant consequences may result. Defendants 
detained prior to trial are more likely to be sentenced to prison than are defendants 
who are released prior to trial.14 That is, the experience of pretrial detention is known 
to undermine—through loss of employment, accommodation, family and other com-
munity ties—defendants’ capacities to present themselves in a light favorable to receiv-
ing a noncustodial sentence.15 A defendant’s appearance and demeanor in court may 
not inspire confidence if he has spent weeks or months in a prison cell; the detained 
defendant is less likely to have character witnesses to use in mitigation of sentence 
than the defendant released awaiting trial; and a detained defendant may have lost his 
job or home and consequently may not be considered as suitable for a suspended sen-
tence, probation, or a fine.16 By contrast, released suspects can be in touch with a lawyer 
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relatively easily and can assist in developing a defense to specific charges. They can 
continue working, paying taxes, and supporting their families. They can also take steps 
to reduce the severity of a sentence if they ultimately are found guilty by, for example, 
getting or keeping a job, maintaining or reestablishing family ties, and developing a 
record of complying with conditions of release.17
Around the world, millions of people are locked up in pretrial detention because 
of corruption.18 Despite the prohibition of corruption under international law—as 
enshrined in the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and other treaties and 
laws—criminal justice systems are often warped by bribery and other forms of corrup-
tion. The pretrial stage (from arrest to trial) of the criminal justice process is particularly 
vulnerable to corrupt practices, and this corruption hits the poor and disenfranchised 
hardest.
Corruption flourishes in the pretrial phase because it receives less scrutiny and 
is subject to more discretion than subsequent stages of the justice process, and often 
involves the lower paid and most junior actors in the system. Police, prosecutors, and 
judges—unhindered by accountability—are able to arrest, detain, and release individu-
als based on their ability to pay bribes. Those caught at the nexus of pretrial detention 
and corruption are particularly vulnerable and suffer for it. Society as a whole also 
pays a high price. Corruption, of course, is itself a bad outcome. But when mixed with 
the power to detain, it leads to other bad outcomes: arbitrary arrests and unnecessary 
detention, increased public health costs, wasted resources, stunted development, and 
increased poverty. The justice system’s credibility suffers when the innocent are arrested 
and even convicted because they cannot pay and the guilty go free because they can.
“The poor need legal aid, not pressure to pay bribes. They need 
proof that everyone is equal before the law.”
—Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 
Thomas Hammarberg
 
All over the world, poor people are arrested because they cannot pay a bribe to the 
corrupt police officer, then denied access to counsel or family because they cannot bribe 
the corrupt guard or prosecutor, then held indefinitely—or found guilty—because they 
cannot bribe the corrupt judge. The ability to put cash in the right hands often makes 
the difference between freedom and detention. Pretrial detention centers are populated 
almost entirely by poor people.
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Once in custody, pretrial detainees are often at the mercy of the detaining authori-
ties, particularly in countries where legal aid or other forms or legal representation are 
lacking or deficient. They or their families are frequently forced to pay for access to 
services and treatment to which they are entitled under national and international law, 
including food, drinking water, medication, or contact with family members. Addition-
ally, they are forced to pay to “prevent” torture or other mistreatment, and demands for 
bribes are often combined with the threat or actual use of torture.
Bangladesh: One Arrest, 34 Bribes
After a member of the Rezzak family was arrested, family members recorded 
the number of occasions on which they were forced to pay bribes and the 
amount they paid. The bribes were paid to secure basic provisions and safe-
guards during police custody and in hope of securing release on bail. Over 
the course of four months (2008-9), the Rezzak family paid a total of 159,660 
Taka (US $2,262) through a total of 34 corrupt transactions. The most sig-
nificant proportion of this amount (a total of 75,000 Taka) was to detain-
ing officers, to prevent torture and the fabrication of more charges against 
their relative. Other significant bribes were to lawyers and legal clerks. The 
remainder was for items that should have been provided by the state, includ-
ing access to legal documents and food for the detained family member.19 
Because it so often exposes detainees to crimogenic influences, the excessive 
and arbitrary use of pretrial detention may actually increase the number of potential 
offenders in a society. There is significant evidence to show that prisons foster criminal 
behavior by serving as schools or breeding grounds for crime.20 In Brazil, for example, 
the influx of pretrial detainees, often on minor charges, is a boon to criminal gangs 
who recruit most of their members from inside prison.21 The pressure to join gangs is 
immense and entering prison—even while innocent—increases the likelihood of fur-
ther conflict with the law. The risk is greater in places where sentenced and unsentenced 
prisoners are not separated, or where pretrial detainees charged with minor offenses are 
incarcerated with detainees suspected of having committed serious crimes—common 
scenarios in many overcrowded prison systems around the world.
A U.S. study has shown that once juveniles are detained awaiting trial, they are 
more likely than nondetained juvenile defendants—even when controlling for differences 
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in the prior records between the two groups—to engage in future delinquent behavior, 
with the “detention experience increasing the odds that the youth will recidivate.”22
Worse than Prison
Perversely, although pretrial detention centers lock up only people who are presumed 
innocent in the eyes of the law, conditions in these centers are often worse than prison. 
Compared to sentenced prisoners, pretrial detainees are at a higher risk of being tor-
tured and contracting disease. They also have fewer opportunities for education and 
training than sentenced prisoners.23 Because pretrial detainees are a transitory popula-
tion, most prison authorities view their detention as temporary and therefore not requir-
ing healthcare, education, or training services.
Many prisons that offer vocational, therapeutic, or other activities to sentenced 
prisoners do not provide the same services to pretrial detainees.24 In Nigeria, according 
to the UN Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, pretrial prisoners “are held in overcrowded cells, lacking appropri-
ate hygiene facilities, with insufficient places to sleep, inadequate and/or insufficient 
food, water, and medical care, let alone any opportunities for educational, leisure, or 
vocational training.”25 The situation is little better in wealthier countries: a report on 
pretrial detainees in Scotland found “their conditions in custody are at best equivalent, 
but most commonly worse than, those of convicted prisoners.”26
Of the more than ten million people in detention (including both pretrial and 
post-conviction detainees) around the world, those held in pretrial detention are most 
at risk of torture.27 Pretrial detainees are wholly in the power of detaining authorities, 
many of whom perceive torture as the fastest way to obtain information or a confession 
and the easiest way to exercise physical and mental control over detainees. Sadly, in 
most systems, this moment of maximum police incentive to torture coincides with the 
period when there are the fewest checks on police activity. Those from the poorest and 
most disadvantaged sectors of society are at particular risk.28 In addition, the very condi-
tions of many pretrial detention centers—marked by severe overcrowding, unsanitary 
conditions, and lack of food—constitute torture.
The excessive use of pretrial detention leads to overcrowded, unhygienic, chaotic, 
and violent environments where pretrial detainees—who have not been convicted—are 
at risk of contracting disease. But they are not the only innocent people whose health is 
threatened by overreliance on pretrial detention: From tuberculosis in Russia to hepa-
titis C in California and HIV/AIDS in South Africa, outbreaks of disease that begin in 
pretrial detention centers quickly spread to the general public. In some cases, pretrial 
detention centers are so bad that innocent people plead guilty just to be transferred to 
prisons where the conditions might be better.
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“It has been estimated that in a given year, about 25% of all 
people who have HIV disease, about 33% who have HCV infec-
tion, and more than 40% who have tuberculosis disease will 
pass through a correctional facility.”
—– Theodore Hammett, 
American Journal of Public Health, June 200629
 
In prisons and other post-conviction detention centers, incoming prisoners may 
be screened for disease, get health care, and even have access to methadone therapy 
and condom distribution. But with rare exceptions, none of this is available in pretrial 
detention. Instead, arrestees are brought in, locked up in a pretrial detention center 
where they are exposed to disease, and then released into society to spread the illnesses 
they have contracted. This is also a danger for prison guards and other employees. In 
2001 in Tomsk, Russia, the local detention center had a TB infection rate of 7,000 
cases per 100,000 inmates. In the surrounding area where most of the prison’s guards 
and administrators lived, the rate was better, but still shockingly high: 4,000 cases per 
100,000 residents.30 (By contrast, Russia’s national rate is 93 cases per 100,000.)31
The negative effects of excessive pretrial detention that are enumerated above—
torture, corruption, the spread of disease, undermining the rule of law—are, in and of 
themselves, bad outcomes. They also contribute to the socioeconomic impact of pretrial 
detention, albeit in ways that are difficult to measure. What are the costs to society when 
the innocent languish behind bars because of corruption? How does one measure the 
lost potential when torture destroys a victim’s body and spirit, leaving him unable to 
work after release? What price does a community pay when one of its members returns 
from pretrial detention carrying tuberculosis? While it is difficult to put a price tag on 
these negative outcomes, the following section makes clear who pays: the poor and 
marginalized. Subsequently, Sections III and IV of this report examine in greater detail 
the socioeconomic costs associated with excessive pretrial detention.
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Impact on the Poor and Marginalized 
“Incarceration is not equal-opportunity.”
—Todd Clear
“The Effects of High Imprisonment Rates on Communities”32
 
Lost human potential is one of the main results of excessive pretrial detention. If 
one assumes that the global average period of pretrial detention is 167 days (this is the 
average in Europe and hence a very conservative estimate for the global figure), then the 
three million persons in pretrial detention will spend a combined total of 501 million 
days in detention—more than half a billion days in lost productivity. By comparison, 
it took 21.2 million man-days to build the Channel Tunnel, one of the world’s largest 
construction projects.33 In theory, therefore, the total time the present cohort of pretrial 
detainees will spend in detention equals the man-days necessary to build 23 Channel 
Tunnels.
Wasted human potential is clearly a result of excessive pretrial detention, whether 
in the developed or developing world. But it is poor people, poor communities, and poor 
States that are more likely to feel the impact—and can least afford the waste. 
Impact on the Poor
Ineffective and corrupt penal systems are most damaging to the poorest and perpetuate 
inequalities in society; conversely, inequalities in society feed unfair and unequal penal 
systems. Reports from around the world indicate that those entering pretrial deten-
tion come from the poorest and most marginalized echelons of society, who are least 
equipped to deal with the criminal justice process and the experiences of detention.34
Independent research and government data consistently show that in both high 
income and low income economies, those who are held in pretrial detention are of 
comparably poor health and education status, are likely to have little formal employ-
ment, and come from fragile family backgrounds. Securing the right to pretrial release 
depends not only on the nature of the charges, but also on being able to argue for that 
option. Those with little education are less likely to understand and advocate for their 
rights. Those with little family or social support are more likely to lack the means to 
secure non-custodial options, including bail. Those without employment or property 
are less likely to meet conditions for sureties.
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“Many people think that torture is primarily the fate of politi-
cal and other ‘high-ranking’ prisoners. In reality, most of the 
victims of arbitrary detention, torture, and inhuman conditions 
are usually ordinary people who belong to the poorest and most 
disadvantaged sectors of society, including those belonging to 
the lowest classes, children, persons with disabilities and dis-
eases, gays, lesbians, bisexuals, transgendered persons, drug 
addicts, aliens, and members of ethnic and religious minorities 
or indigenous communities.”
—Manfred Nowak, UN Special Rapporteur on torture
 
The study Prison Conditions in Africa,35 reporting on South Africa, Egypt, Cote 
D’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Senegal, and The Gambia, finds: “In all countries studied, the 
majority of those in prison come from very poor backgrounds, often having received 
little education. Only a fairly small proportion of prisoners had formal paid employment 
at the time they committed their offences, many of the offences of which the prison-
ers are convicted are relatively minor property offences.”36 While the report focuses on 
sentenced prisoners, it seems likely that the pretrial detention population would be 
largely the same.
In Nepal, of the 3,874 detainees in police detention centers interviewed by the 
NGO Advocacy Forum in 2009, more than 65 percent were ethnic minorities or 
Dalits—the poorest of the poor.37 In India, one study estimated that 80 percent of the 
prison population had only a primary school education or were illiterate, while 50 per-
cent were either unemployed or employed in low-paying agricultural work.38
There are a host of reasons why the poor are more likely to come into conflict 
with the law, and less likely to be able to avoid pretrial detention. This is also true of 
members of minority groups and other marginalized populations. Pretrial detention is 
often applied in a discriminatory fashion, and these groups are often the victims of that 
discrimination. The impact of excessive pretrial detention on marginalized populations, 
including women, is severe and disproportionate.
Impact on Women, Ethnic Minorities, Non-Citizens, and Other Vulnerable Groups
Women prisoners constitute a small minority of the pretrial detention population, and 
as a result their particular needs are often neglected. Yet the physical, emotional, and 
social consequences of incarceration on women are acute and enduring. Issues such 
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as separation from families, mental and emotional health problems, issues related to 
pregnancy and childcare, violations of human rights, and limited access to health care 
and other services are all faced by women prisoners.39
The vast majority of female pretrial detainees are accused of petty, non-violent 
offenses for which they should be eligible for pretrial release. Many have also suffered 
physical and emotional abuse, or have mental health problems or alcohol or drug depen-
dency—factors that should mitigate against pretrial detention. There are also factors 
that expose women to excessive pretrial detention but do not apply to men: in certain 
culturally conservative societies, women can be detained for dressing improperly or for 
conducting extramarital affairs—“crimes” for which men would not be punished.40 In 
many socially conservative States, life for released women prisoners is deeply problem-
atic, particularly if the offenses they were accused of were “moral”41 crimes, in which 
case family links are usually irredeemably broken.
The profile of pretrial detainees is an issue about which the UN Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has raised concerns. It warns that “persons 
held awaiting trial include an excessively high number of non-nationals” and “persons 
belonging to racial or ethnic groups, in particular non-citizens—including immigrants, 
refugees, asylum-seekers, and stateless persons—Roma, indigenous peoples, displaced 
populations, persons discriminated against because of their descent, as well as other 
vulnerable groups which are particularly exposed to exclusion, marginalization, and 
non-integration in society.”42
Non-citizens are in many countries over-represented in the pretrial population. 
Because they lack a fixed address or residence permit, they are considered more likely 
to abscond and/or reoffend and are usually excluded from alternatives to detention.43 
Members of the most marginalized groups in society, including “people with poor 
health and chronic, untreated conditions, drug users, the vulnerable and those who 
engage in risky activities such as injecting drugs and commercial sex work,” are all 
overrepresented in prison (and, one may extrapolate, in pretrial detention).44
The State of the Field
Pretrial detention is difficult to measure: governments are often reluctant to divulge 
information about their prisons; many prison systems are closed to outside monitors; 
pretrial detainees can be held in a multitude of settings, from holding cells in police 
stations to prisons where they are mixed with convicted inmates; and the high turnover 
rate of pretrial detainees means the population changes every day. For these reasons, esti-
mates of the global pretrial detention population—including those used in this report—
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are likely quite conservative. The real number of pretrial detainees is almost certainly 
much higher than the figures that are most commonly cited by experts in the field.
Even where data are available, they are often limited. Different jurisdictions may 
define the term differently (for example, by counting or not counting prisoners who 
have been found guilty but not yet sentenced), or a ssign to different authorities the 
responsibility for counting. In some countries, data are tracked by the government, but 
in others this task falls to NGOs that may be forced to take a snapshot of the popula-
tion in a specific location and then extrapolate from there. All of this makes comparing 
data across jurisdictions or generating total data for a region particularly challenging. 
Further compounding the problem is that most good data come from the devel-
oped world, and the best data come from countries, such as those in Northern Europe, 
with low pretrial detention rates. On the other hand, many countries with draconian 
criminal justice systems either do not divulge information about their prison populations 
or deliberately under-report them. Similarly, data from developing countries—which, as 
noted earlier, have the highest percentage of all detainees who are pretrial—are often 
incomplete or inaccurate. It should be noted that, due to the lack of reliable data, this 
report occasionally resorts to using data on sentenced prisoners as a proxy for pretrial 
detainees.
It should also be noted that this report does not claim a causal link between 
pretrial detention and poverty. But there is clearly a mutually-reinforcing relationship 
between the two. There is a connection between excessive pretrial detention and 
numerous indicators of socioeconomic development—including income, employment, 
and educational attainment—which is explored further in Sections III and IV of this 
publication.
The dearth of good data on pretrial detention and inexact relationship between 
excessive pretrial detention and socioeconomic development point to the desperate need 
for more research. Outside of a small group of penal reformers and human rights advo-
cates, excessive pretrial detention and its socioeconomic impact are largely overlooked. 
But the global scope of the problem, its severity, and its ripple effects across communi-
ties and generations all argue for urgent attention and investigation. In particular, pre-
trial detention’s impact on development suggests the need for research by economists 
and other development experts. Anyone working in the field of poverty reduction and 
economic development should be interested in the reform and reduction of pretrial 
detention.
But this is not merely an academic exercise. Without knowing the full costs of 
excessive pretrial detention, it is impossible for States to make rational policy choices 
regarding it. Policy choices are easily warped by incomplete information: when problems 
are poorly documented and hence poorly understood, the “solutions” are often flawed.
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III. Impact on Individuals 
 and Families
The excessive and arbitrary use of pretrial detention critically undermines socioeco-
nomic development—and is especially harmful to the poor. Pretrial detention dispro-
portionately affects individuals and families living in poverty: they are more likely to 
come into conflict with the criminal justice system, more likely to be detained awaiting 
trial, and less able to make bail or pay bribes for their release. Those living in—or at 
the edge of—poverty have the fewest resources to handle the socioeconomic shocks of 
pretrial detention and they are more easily plunged into (or further into) destitution, 
including hunger and homelessness.
The socioeconomic impact of pretrial detention falls not simply on the prisoner. 
The employment and income lost as a result of excessive pretrial detention affect the 
prisoner’s family. The impact is especially severe in poor, developing countries where 
the state does not provide reliable financial assistance to the indigent and where it is 
not unusual for one breadwinner to financially support an extended family network. 
Wealthier countries have the resources to absorb a greater percentage of the costs asso-
ciated with pretrial detention; poorer countries tend to spend less on criminal justice, 
meaning more of the costs of pretrial detention fall on the individuals, their families, 
and communities. 
This section examines the costs to pretrial detainees and their families as mea-
sured by income and employment, education, incarceration-related expenses, and long-
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term effects, while the subsequent section looks at impacts on communities and States. 
Reliable cost analyses are difficult to find. Hence, while these sections explore the fac-
tors that must be considered in assessing the socioeconomic impact of excessive pretrial 
detention, they generally do not seek to assign a monetary figure to those impacts. 
Fortunately, the monetary impact of pretrial detention has been calculated for a handful 
of countries, including Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Ukraine. The Mexico study, in 
particular, demonstrates what is possible in the field. Those studies are cited below and 
the Mexico study is summarized at greater length in Appendix 1.
Income and Employment 
Persons detained awaiting trial cannot work or earn income while detained, and fre-
quently lose their jobs—often after only a short period away from their work. If the 
period of detention is lengthy, detainees’ future earning potential is also undermined. 
Those who are self-employed—common to people working in much of the developing 
world—are at risk of bankruptcy, losing their goods through theft, missing sowing or 
harvesting season, or foregoing their trading space at the local market.
In Mexico, a study estimated the amount of income lost, as a result of their deten-
tion, by the country’s pretrial detainees who were employed at the time of arrest, as 
1.3 billion pesos (or about US $100 million) in 2006.45 In England and Wales, half of 
men and two-thirds of women employed at the time of arrest lost their jobs as a result 
of their pretrial detention.46 In Argentina, a study published in 2009 estimated the 
amount of income lost by pretrial detainees at nearly 40 million pesos (or over US $10 
million) per year.47
Pretrial detainees are not only at risk of losing their employment at the time of 
detention, but also risk long-term unemployment or underemployment after release. 
The stigma of detention, combined with lost education or training opportunities, 
severely limits detainees’ lifetime incomes. This is exacerbated by the fact that most 
pretrial detainees are between ages 20 and 40—their wage-earning peak. Income lost 
at this point in their lives almost certainly cannot be regained.
In countries that have Social Security or some other form of retirement program, 
the income lost today by a pretrial detainee will also hurt him later in life due to reduced 
contributions to the retirement plan. In Mexico, lost Social Security contributions caused 
by pretrial detention were estimated at 17.6 million pesos (US $1.4 million) annually.48
For every pretrial detainee who loses his job as a result of detention, there is a 
family paying the price. In some cases, his spouse—and even his children—must find 
work to make up for the lost income. But in other cases, his spouse must quit work 
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because of the demands imposed by incarceration, including court appearances, prison 
visits, and taking food and other necessities to the incarcerated spouse.
Benin: Lost Income, Thwarted Ambitions
A prisoner in Benin, who had been in pretrial detention for 30 months, 
reported that his family was trying to raise money to pay a lawyer. As a 
result of his detention, his wife's plans to start a business—a hairdressing 
salon—had to be abandoned and she was forced to work instead in the far 
less lucrative trade of street hairdressing. Not only had her small enter-
prise been scuttled, but her working hours were reduced by fruitless visits 
to the prosecutor and her daily visits to take food to the prison. In addition, 
her expenses increased because of travel demands. Her husband’s arrest 
pushed her from the brink of middle class stability to the edge of poverty.49 
For the already-poor, the loss of income can be crippling. If, for example, the 
detainee and his spouse are subsistence farmers, it is likely impossible for the spouse 
to take on any additional work. In such a scenario, the spouse may be forced to sell the 
family’s belongings, hastening the descent into abject poverty.
Particularly in socially conservative societies, it can be difficult for families to 
support themselves without a male income provider, as women have very limited oppor-
tunities for employment. In these cases, the pretrial detention of the male wage earner 
is practically a guarantee of dire poverty. In Afghanistan, for example, the families of 
detained men are commonly reduced to begging because no other options for earning 
income are available.50
Education
Many pretrial detainees are young adults, some of whom will have their education inter-
rupted as a result of their detention. Other detainees may have their job training inter-
rupted, making it harder to find a job upon release and limiting their lifetime earning 
potential. As discussed in Section II, education and training opportunities are virtually 
nonexistent in pretrial detention, even if they are available to sentenced prisoners.
In addition, the education of children is often disrupted when a parent is detained. 
These children have to take on new roles, including providing domestic, emotional, or 
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financial support for other family members. According to an NGO report, such children 
“may have to move to a new area, a new home or a new school because of imprison-
ment.”51 A review of the literature on children whose mothers are detained found that 
those “children’s lives are greatly disrupted… resulting in heightened rates of school 
failure and eventual criminal activity.”52 A study of the children of imprisoned mothers 
found an “increased likelihood of their becoming ‘NEET’ (Not in Education, Employ-
ment or Training).”53 Particularly in developing countries, children are commonly forced 
out of school and into work, to replace the lost income of detained adults.
Prison-Related Expenses
Entering pretrial detention not only limits one’s income and earning potential—it actu-
ally costs money. Wealthier detainees may have to absorb the cost of private defense 
counsel (although, as noted earlier, wealthier people are unlikely to find themselves 
in pretrial detention). In developing countries, authorities often fail to provide basic 
necessities, so detainees must pay for food, water, clothing, and bedding. Commonly, 
they must also pay bribes for “privileges” such as making a phone call, securing a place 
to sleep, and avoiding or lessening beatings. In Mexico, the annual cost to detainees 
of these extra-legal payments was estimated at 539 million pesos (US $42.3 million),54 
while in Argentina it was estimated at 9 million pesos (US $2.3 million).55 It is impor-
tant to bear in mind that Argentina and Mexico are not considered developing countries 
and that the impact of bribes paid by pretrial detainees in poorer countries may be more 
severe when considered as a percentage of detainees’ income or net worth.
Equatorial Guinea: The Water Costs, but the Malaria Is Free
A male detainee kept in police custody for several months was forced to pay 
for food and drinking water. Kept in a cell that was partially open to the sky, 
he had no protection against malaria-carrying mosquitoes. He was repeat-
edly denied a hearing before a judge, access to a lawyer, or contact with his 
family.56 To calculate the costs to the man and his family, it would be neces-
sary to add up—at a minimum—the man’s lost income (both immediate 
and lifetime), the burden on his spouse, the lost educational opportunities 
for his children, the direct costs of his food and water, and the costs of his 
contracting malaria. 
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In addition to lost income, the families of pretrial detainees must wrestle with 
legal fees, the cost of bribes to corrupt criminal justice officials, and other expenses. 
When an income-earner is detained, family members must adjust not only to the loss of 
that income but also to costs of supporting that family member in detention, including 
travel to visit the detainee, food and personal items for the detainee, and, often, bribes 
to guards.
The UN Special Rapporteur on torture observed that in Nigeria, “Pretrial detain-
ees reported that they are forced to pay for food, bathing, or contacting family members, 
receiving visitors, or medication.”57
In Argentina, the total direct cost to families of pretrial detainees—including 
assistance to detainees (food, clothing, etc.), time and expense of visiting, private legal 
counsel, and bribes—was estimated at 88.7 million pesos (US $22.5 million) per year.58 
In Mexico, the total cost to families was estimated to be 1.9 billion pesos (US $150 mil-
lion) per year.59
Long-Term and Intergenerational Effects
Although an individual’s pretrial detention may last only a few weeks, the impact can 
be felt over the rest of his life—and indeed, into the next generation.
There is a body of research—focused primarily on sentenced prisoners—link-
ing the imprisonment of parents to negative outcomes for their children, including 
increased propensity for violence and other antisocial behaviors, increased likelihood 
of suffering anxiety and depression, and decreased school attendance.60 Although it is 
not clear that a parent’s incarceration is by itself responsible for increased likelihood of 
criminality in the child, it is clear that children of imprisoned parents are more likely 
to one day be imprisoned themselves.61
In some cases, young people and children are detained when adults are put into 
pretrial detention. This is particularly true when women are placed in pretrial deten-
tion. With a focus on pretrial detention, the Quaker United Nations Office reports that 
globally “most female offenders are the sole or main carer of minor children and this 
should be taken into consideration in decisions about pretrial detention. Caring respon-
sibilities may be evidence of being less likely to abscond. At the same time, the negative 
impact on children of their mother being detained should be taken into account and be 
an added incentive to use non-custodial alternatives to pretrial detention.”62
For juveniles, pretrial detention interrupts their education, making it more dif-
ficult for some to return to school and find employment. Indeed, “economists have 
shown that the process of incarcerating youth will reduce their future earnings and their 
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ability to remain in the workforce, and could change formerly detained youth into less 
stable employees.”63 The failure of detained juveniles to return to school affects public 
safety as, according to the U.S. Department of Education, school dropouts are three and 
a half times more likely than high school graduates to be arrested.64
For pretrial detainees who contract disease or who are damaged physically or 
psychologically by torture during their detention, the long-term effects are so great as 
to be nearly incalculable. A man who emerges from pretrial detention having contracted 
HIV risks passing it to his wife. He will have a shorter lifespan and reduced earning 
potential, which can affect the educational attainment and hence income potential of his 
children. And the disease will cost his family in the form of medical bills and the wages 
they forfeit while caring for him. For even a wealthy family, this scenario is disastrous. 
For an already poor family, it is a nightmare.
England: The Impact of Detention on a Family
A 29-year-old truck driver lived with his wife, his retired-father-in-law, and 
his eight-year-old son in a council house in England. He was arrested in 
connection with a robbery and held in pretrial detention after police suc-
cessfully opposed bail. When the case was scheduled for trial, the police 
withdrew their objection and bail was granted. After almost four weeks in 
pretrial detention, the defendant found he had lost his job and the rent on 
the house where he had lived for seven years was in arrears. He and his fam-
ily were evicted. The mental strain of the situation caused the defendant’s 
wife to suffer a nervous breakdown and so disturbed his son that he had to 
be given psychiatric treatment. The defendant found it difficult to get work 
and could not obtain unemployment benefits because he was awaiting trial 
and was not, according to the local labor bureau, available for work. Four 
months after his arrest the defendant was tried and acquitted. 
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IV. Impact on Communities 
 and States
“The evidence of direct impacts of a lack of security and justice 
on poor people in many developing countries is very strong. 
Insecurity and injustice can be an acute source of vulnerability, 
tipping households into destitution”
—Marcus Cox,
Security and Justice: Measuring the Development Returns 65
 
Impact on Communities
As well as the consequences for individuals and their families, pretrial detention can 
have an impact on the wider community, helping entrench the disadvantaged char-
acteristics of that community. This is particularly clear with regard to marginalized 
communities (as described in Section II) against whom pretrial detention is applied 
in a discriminatory manner. The over-use of pretrial detention in these communities 
harms not only those detained, but the community as a whole, depriving it of parents, 
income-earners, teachers, role models, and political leaders. The community impact 
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of excessive pretrial detention furthers the social exclusion of marginalized groups, 
increases their poverty, and decreases their political power. In Chile, for example, mem-
bers of the Mapuche indigenous group claim that racially-motivated, disproportionate 
pretrial detention is used against them to weaken their community politically and take 
their land.66
An additional impact on communities comes in the form of communicable 
diseases contracted in pretrial detention centers and spread to the community when 
detainees are released. Diseases such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis C, and tuberculosis are 
common in many pretrial detention centers, spread quickly both within and beyond the 
prison walls, and impose massive costs on the communities they affect. An extensive 
body of literature documents the socioeconomic impact of communicable diseases on 
poor and disadvantaged communities.67
Malawi: The Impact of Detention on a Community, Part I
A man was detained pretrial in Maula prison, meaning that his wife had to 
fix their thatched roof, chop wood, cultivate the garden, and look after their 
four boys. To pay for the costs associated with incarceration, the family had 
to sell its most precious possession, its radio—the only radio in the village. 
The buyer came from another village, and when he took the radio away 
with him, the entire community was left without a link to the outside world. 
People in the community now must walk to the next village just to hear the 
news or find out if the weather forecast favors planting.68 
Malawi: The Impact of Detention on a Community, Part II
When the male head of a household in rural Malawi was arrested and 
detained, his family had to sell its maize-milling machine to obtain cash for 
his legal fees, bail, and money to bribe him out of detention. The milling 
machine had brought steady income into the household, and its sale meant 
the family would have no money to hire labor or buy seeds for their beetroot 
plots. The beetroot production ceased and income from the crops was lost. 
The new owner of the milling machine moved it to a distant location. Now 
the community no longer has a milling machine, and women in the area have 
had to go back to pounding maize by hand, which increases their workload 
and lowers their productivity.69
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As the examples from Malawi demonstrate, in some places familial and commu-
nity relationships mean that the loss of one economically active member has an impact 
far beyond their immediate dependents. In low income economies, the dependency 
ratio is around six dependents to each income earner. In some particularly impover-
ished rural areas of Africa, dependency ratios in excess of 1:200 have been reported.70 
In such instances, the impact of pretrial detention spreads far beyond the immediate 
family and shakes the entire community.
Impact on States
For the State, every pretrial detention means increased expense (direct costs), reduced 
revenue (indirect costs), and fewer resources for other programs (opportunity costs).
Direct Costs
The direct costs to the State of pretrial detention include operating detention facili-
ties (including prison guards and administrators), warehousing detainees (including 
food, clothing, beds, and healthcare—assuming these are provided), and pursuing cases 
against detainees (including the investigation and judicial process). The often massive 
costs of constructing prisons are not usually ascribed to pretrial detention, because 
sentenced prisoners—not pretrial detainees—are thought of as the primary residents. 
Of course, States can attempt to reduce the costs of pretrial detention by squeez-
ing ten detainees into a cell designed for four, supplying little or low quality food, and 
cutting back on security and medical care. Such practices significantly reduce the mar-
ginal cost of pretrial detention. And yet, by skimping on expenses for the maintenance 
of pretrial detention facilities and the care of inmates, governments do not reduce the 
overall cost of pretrial detention. Rather, such costs are transferred elsewhere, usually 
to detainees, their families, and the broader community.
In Mexico, the State’s cost of pursuing a criminal case is usually higher for pretrial 
detainees than for defendants who are at liberty. Pretrial detainees have a higher num-
ber of hearings than defendants who are not detained, and the State must bear all costs 
associated with those hearings, including transportation for the detainee and guards to 
accompany him. Defendants released pending trial must pay their own transportation 
costs and do not travel under guard.
A 2006 study by the Institute of Applied Humanitarian Research in Ukraine 
found the total annual cost of pretrial detention to be US $51 million, of which the 
State paid 59 percent, or US $30 million.71 In Mexico, the State bears 58 percent of the 
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direct costs; the annual direct cost to the State of pretrial detention was estimated at 5.8 
billion pesos (US $454 million).72 In Argentina, where the State carried 68 percent of 
the direct costs, the State’s direct costs were estimated to be 294 million pesos (US $75 
million).73 In all three countries, detainees and their families were forced to bear the 
remaining percentage of the direct costs.
Indirect Costs 
It is difficult to make a rational policy decision without an accurate sense of the eco-
nomic cost of the policy in comparison to alternatives.74 Yet, traditionally, the cost of 
pretrial detention (as publicly reported by governments) is calculated solely by adding 
together the State’s direct expenses accrued in accommodating, feeding, and caring 
for pretrial detainees. No effort is made to calculate the larger, indirect costs to society 
and the State of lost productivity, reduced tax payments, or diseases transmitted from 
prison to the community when detainees are eventually released, to name just a few 
examples. The traditional approach to calculating the costs of pretrial detention is thus 
both short-sighted and misleading. 
The actual cost of pretrial detention is often hidden. Assessing the true costs of 
pretrial detention requires considering the full impact of excessive pretrial detention on 
not just the detainees, but their families and communities—a calculation that is both 
difficult to make and politically unpalatable to most governments.
The cost studies conducted in Mexico and Argentina made a limited effort to 
calculate indirect costs, focusing on Social Security payments lost as a result of pretrial 
detention, as well as some healthcare costs (in Mexico, the cost of families who lost 
private health insurance as a result of pretrial detention and joined the government’s 
healthcare system; in Argentina, the costs of post-release HIV care for those who con-
tracted it in pretrial detention). Even this modest effort illuminated the waste inherent 
in locking up large numbers of people who by law must be considered innocent: Argen-
tina spent an estimated 1.4 million pesos (US $356,000) per year on indirect costs,75 
while Mexico spent an estimated 6.2 million pesos (US $486,000).76
Opportunity Costs
All governments have limited resources, and all policy decisions have costs. Every dollar 
or peso a government spends on incarceration is a dollar or peso that cannot be spent 
on healthcare or policing or education. Similarly, money spent on pretrial detention 
by the detainee, his family, and the community could also have been used differently.
Excessive pretrial detention—especially for persons charged with minor, non-vio-
lent offenses—is costly and restricts States’ ability to invest in socioeconomic develop-
ment. For poor countries, where State budgets are rarely balanced and State funding to 
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meet the basic needs of all citizens is inadequate, expenditure on incarcerating pretrial 
detainees represents a stark opportunity cost. Every bit of State revenue spent on deten-
tion results in potentially less money for health, housing, and education. 
The various factors through which pretrial detention weakens socioeconomic 
development are not mutually exclusive, but overlap and reinforce one another. Thus, 
detaining a large group of people is not only costly for the State (and, thereby, the tax-
payer), but has negative financial and social repercussions for detainees, their families, 
and society at large. Reducing the excessive use of pretrial detention can boost socioeco-
nomic development at the family and community level, especially in developing coun-
tries where the difference between a stable existence and bare survival is often tenuous.
With States grappling with poverty reduction strategies and making tough deci-
sion on where to invest limited resources, the direct expenditure on unnecessary incar-
ceration should not be ignored.
The study of pretrial detention costs in Mexico compares the total costs of pretrial 
detention to other government expenditures (social programs and security) to illustrate 
the arguable disconnect between government policies. The total spent on pretrial deten-
tion was half a billion pesos more than the 2006 federal budget for public safety, and 
equal to just over a quarter of the budget for Mexico’s social assistance program Opor-
tunidades, which reaches 27 million people. Reducing expenditure on pretrial deten-
tion would allow greater investment in the vulnerable population benefiting from the 
Oportunidades program that could lead to more employment opportunities and eco-
nomic development that in turn could have a preventive effect on new recruitment into 
criminal activities.
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V. Conclusions and 
 Recommendations
Excessive pretrial detention has a harmful—and completely avoidable—impact on indi-
viduals, families, communities, and States. That impact is most profound and most 
harmful for those who can least afford it. It wastes human potential, wrecks lives, and 
distorts government policy. As this report has sought to demonstrate, excessive pretrial 
detention:
• Ensnares millions of people each year and affects hundreds of millions more.
• Spreads disease, furthers corruption, and undermines the rule of law.
• Has a disproportionate impact on the poor and marginalized.
• Reduces the income of detainees, pushes their families toward poverty, and dam-
ages the education and income potential of their children.
• Impoverishes communities, misdirects States’ spending, and limits their policy 
options.
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Reducing and Reforming Pretrial Detention
Most pretrial detainees should not be in detention. They pose no threat to society and 
are not at risk of absconding. In South Africa, the government spends R2.2 million (US 
$300,000) a day jailing people who have been granted bail but are unable to afford it.77 
In England and Wales, 19 percent of those in pretrial detention were acquitted, and 
another 30 percent received non-custodial sentences.78 Eighty percent of the 100,000 
people passing through the Cook County jail (pretrial detention facility) in Chicago each 
year are not given a prison sentence.79 An eventual acquittal or a non-custodial sentence 
does not per se mean that pretrial detention was unnecessary. It is likely, however, that 
in many such cases a more careful review of the circumstances of the defendant and 
his likely risk of absconding would have permitted his release awaiting trial within the 
ambit of international law and standards.
This waste is avoidable: better, cheaper alternatives to pretrial detention exist. 
Implementing them is not so much a question of resources as it is of political will. In 
Scotland, Glasgow’s City Council in August 2009 launched an alternative to pretrial 
detention for young people.80 Instead of holding them in pretrial detention, the program 
releases them and focuses on monitoring and offering an array of social services. The 
program costs only one-fifth of pretrial detention and has reduced offending rates by 
50 percent.81
In many cases those in pretrial detention should be actively contributing to the 
growth of societies, using their potential to benefit themselves and others. Yet govern-
ment policies that involve excessive or indiscriminate use of pretrial detention render 
this significant cohort less able to contribute to growth and stability. In essence, govern-
ments are spending money on a system that undermines their own development poli-
cies. They are preventing marginalized communities and individuals from making the 
most of the few opportunities they have. Indiscriminate and excessive pretrial detention 
deepens social exclusion.
While the ten million per year who pass through pretrial detention may seem 
small compared to the billions of people of concern to development frameworks such as 
the Millennium Development Goals, it must be remembered that those entering pretrial 
detention are among the most marginalized, poorest, and the hardest to reach members 
of society and as such must be of core interest in poverty reduction and development. It 
should also be remembered that the 10 million people who go through pretrial deten-
tion each year are the tip of the iceberg: there are hundreds of millions of family and 
community members affected by those 10 million pretrial detentions.
Pretrial detention lies at the nexus of a host of bad outcomes. If one wanted to 
reduce poverty, torture, corruption, or disease, one could attack those problems sever-
ally. Or, one could reduce the excessive use of pretrial detention.
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Recommendations
• Pretrial detention should be used only when no reasonable alternative can address 
genuine risks of flight or danger to the community. States would better serve their 
citizens by spending less on locking up people who are presumed innocent and 
dedicating more resources to social services.
• Particularly in communities where economic privation is widespread, the use of 
monetary bail should be avoided. Poor people do not have money readily available 
to deposit with the court. In place of bail, courts should use personal surety (a 
promise by the defendant to attend court hearings and stand trial) or reporting 
requirements under which the defendant reports regularly to the local police sta-
tion as a condition of remaining free pending trial.
• Where monetary bail is used it should be proportionate to an accused person’s 
income and within his means.
• Detained persons should receive basic necessities—nutritious food, clothing, toi-
letries, and medication—free of charge from the prison authorities.
• Independent monitoring bodies should be supported in regularly monitoring 
detention centers, including police lock-ups and other places of pretrial detention.
• Governments should regularly publish official statistics on their pretrial detention 
policies, practices, and population.
• To the extent practicable, pretrial detainees should be able to volunteer (though 
they should not be coerced) to perform prison-based labor for remuneration, and 
should be eligible for training and education programs.
• Further research should be conducted on the scope of pretrial detention and its 
impact on development.
This report draws on diverse and scattered sources of information. With the 
exception of a small number of country-specific case studies, little up-to-date research 
exists. Further work is urgently needed in order to better understand the socioeconomic 
implications of excessive pretrial detention and shape appropriate policy responses. 
Specific areas ripe for further research include:
• Country-specific surveys examining the over-representation of poor and marginal-
ized communities in detention.
• Country-specific case studies that document the socioeconomic impact of pretrial 
detention on families and communities.
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• Country-specific economic studies utilizing rigorous methodologies to count the 
costs of pretrial detention.
• Thematic studies that link excessive pretrial detention to other policy areas, 
including the Millennium Development Goals.
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Appendix 1: 
Summary of Costly Confinement: 
The Direct and Indirect Costs of 
Pretrial Detention in Mexico
Since 2008, the Open Society Justice Initiative has collaborated with local research 
experts to analyze the economic consequences of Mexico’s pretrial detention laws and 
practices. The resulting report, Costly Confinement,82 documents both the direct and 
indirect (or “hidden”) costs of pretrial detention in Mexico as borne by the state, detain-
ees and their families, and the general public. This summary presents for an English-
speaking audience the principal findings and recommendations of that report.
A more accurate approach to calculating the economic consequences of pretrial 
detention includes costs which are not always readily apparent. An inclusive approach 
provides the bigger picture policymakers need to make more informed decisions about 
the financial sacrifices required to sustain a pretrial detention regime. It is for these 
reasons that the Justice Initiative commissioned a report to calculate the direct and 
indirect costs of pretrial detention in Mexico.
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The Real Cost of Pretrial Detention in Mexico
The findings of the Justice Initiative report on the cost of pretrial detention in Mexico 
are summarized in Table 1. The data contained in the table use Mexico’s currency, the 
peso, at 2006 prices (the latest year for which data was available at the time the report 
was compiled).83
Table 1 categorizes the economic burdens of pretrial detention on four distinct 
groups: the detainees, the state, detainees’ families, and the broader community. Each 
of these categories is further subdivided to reflect more specific costs. Because the 
available data does not permit a precise picture, a three-tiered range of assumptions 
(minimum, maximum, and median) about each cost factor are built into the calculation 
and reflected in three columns.
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TABLE 1:
Annual cost of pretrial detention in Mexico (in thousands of pesos)
Median Minimum Maximum
1. Costs to the detainees
 a. Labor costs (absence of economic activity) 1,331,377 273,095 2,683,186
 b. Risk of death and illness
  i. Risk of homicide 80,293 46,582 113,213
  ii. Lack of medical attention 36,727 35,468 37,008
 c. Employers' payments to Social Security 17,649 3,620 35,569
 d. Extra-legal payments (corruption charges) 538,828 520,367 542,962
Total 2,004,873 879,133 3,411,938
2. Costs to the state
 a. Detainees’ support 4,007,530 3,187,250 4,750,920
 b. Criminal process
  i. Investigation 583,839 557,284 597,088
  ii. Judicial process 1,108,967 1,058,527 1,134,134
  iii. Public defense and social assistance  88,233 85,210 88,910
 c. Health care provided to detainees’ relatives 814 0 4,704
 d. Employers’ contributions to social security 5,455 1,119 10,994
Total 5,794,839 4,889,390 6,586,751
3. Costs to the families of the detainees 
 a. Assistance/support to detainees 480,709 321,968 732,771
 b. Time spent on visits to detainees 86,926 12,366 228,874
 c. Representation by private attorneys 1,324,237 361,145 3,869,398
 d. Extra-legal payments (corruption charges) 15,180 10,167 19,985
Total 1,907,053 705,646 4,851,028
4. Costs to the community
 a. Services by social organizations 72,169 69,697 72,723
 b. Lost productivity 1,331,377 1,285,764 2,386,210
Total 1,403,546 1,355,460 2,458,933
Total social cost* 9,755,829 6,558,084 14,895,658
* The total social cost excludes items 1(c), 2(d), and 4(b) to avoid double counting certain costs. 
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Cost to detainees 
Based on the number of persons who were in pretrial detention in Mexico in mid-
2006, the annual cost of detention for all pretrial detainees ranges between 0.8 billion 
and 3.4 billion pesos, with a median cost of 2 billion pesos (unless otherwise stated, 
the median cost will be used from here on). This is calculated by adding the following 
variables: the amount of income that pretrial detainees who were employed at the time 
of their arrest would have earned had they not been detained (1.3 billion pesos);84 the 
financial value of life lost or shortened due to the increased risk of homicide (80.3 mil-
lion pesos) and illness (17.7 million pesos) pretrial detainees face; the annual value of 
the contribution the state and employers would have made to the social security funds 
of pretrial detainees who were employed at the time of their arrest (17.7 million pesos); 
and the amount of money pretrial detainees pay to corrupt guards and other detainees 
to, respectively, purchase favorable treatment and protection from prison gangs (538.8 
million pesos), a widespread phenomenon in the deeply corrupt institutional culture 
of Mexico’s custodial settings.
Cost to the state
The overall annual cost of detention to the state is 5.8 billion pesos. (This does not 
include the significant costs associated with the planning and construction of detention 
facilities, because reliable data on those costs are not available.) The largest portion of 
this expense is used for the management and administration of the country’s detention 
facilities, including the cost of food, medicine, and clothes for detainees, and general 
prison maintenance and related expenses (4 billion pesos).
Other costs are the additional expenses incurred by the investigative and judicial 
authorities, and the public defender system, to deal with defendants detained awaiting 
trial (1.8 billion). On average, it is far more costly for the prosecutor’s office to investi-
gate a case involving a pretrial detainee than one in which the defendant is at liberty. 
This is because cases involving detainees must, by law, be expedited (e.g., defendants 
who the state wants remanded into detention have to appear before a court within 48 
hours of their arrest). Once remanded, pretrial detainees face, on average, a higher 
number of court hearings than defendants who are not detained, and the state bears the 
cost of transporting these detainees between their places of detention and the courts. 
(Despite this, Mexican prosecutors exhibit a strong preference for pursuing cases with 
a suspect in detention, and judges rarely limit this tendency in their review of cases.)
The state also bears the public health care costs of detainees’ dependants who lose 
access to private health care as a result of their relatives’ pretrial detention (814,000 
pesos). Finally, the state ultimately bears the cost of missed contributions to the Mexican 
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Social Security Institute (a statutory body tasked with managing the country’s public 
health, pension, and social security systems) which detainees’ employers would have 
made had the former not lost their freedom (5.5 million pesos).
Cost to detainees’ families
Detainees’ families suffer an annual economic loss of 1.9 billion pesos as a result of their 
relatives’ pretrial detention. This includes the cost of supporting their detained relatives 
with money, food, toiletries, medicines, clothes, and other miscellaneous items not sup-
plied—or not adequately supplied—by the prison authorities (481 million pesos), and 
the economic value of the time spent visiting their detained relatives (87 million pesos).
Lawyers’ fees are higher when defending pretrial detainees because the lawyers 
charge for the additional burden of having to arrange and undertake visits to their 
clients’ places of detention and attending, on average, a higher number of pretrial hear-
ings. Thus, the families of pretrial detainees incur an additional total cost of 1.3 billion 
pesos per year. Despite the fact that criminal defendants are overwhelmingly poor and 
the cost of a private attorney is a significant burden, some 40 percent of detainees 
make use of a private lawyer. The others either go without legal representation or are 
fortunate to be provided with a lawyer by the state (in the latter case the cost is borne 
by the state—and, by extension, the taxpayer).
Finally, pretrial detainees’ families pay some 15.2 million pesos annually in bribes 
to corrupt prison officials. Such payments are made to facilitate the transfer of gifts and 
messages to detainees.
Community costs
Universities and welfare organizations spend about 72.2 million pesos a year to, respec-
tively, provide free legal assistance, and food, clothes, medication, job training, and 
other services to detainees and their families. Moreover, Mexico’s pretrial detention 
practices cost society an estimated 1.3 billion pesos worth of lost productivity. This is 
the value of the economic output individuals working at the time of their arrest would 
have generated had they not been detained.
Total cost
To arrive at the total annual cost of pretrial detention practices in Mexico it is necessary 
to total the various detention-related costs listed in Table 1 above, excluding three cost 
items which, from an accounting point of view, would otherwise be counted twice.85 
This exercise results in an annual cost of 9.8 billion pesos (with a possible range from 
a low of 6.6 billion pesos to a high of 14.9 billion pesos). This is a substantial amount, 
which in 2006 was equal to the average annual income of 91,000 Mexican families, or 
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about half a billion pesos more than annual federal spending on public safety.86
Moreover, the median annual cost of pretrial detention is equivalent to a bit over 
a quarter (28 percent) of the money the state spends yearly on Oportunidades, Mexico’s 
world-renowned government social assistance program, which has been replicated in 
at least 30 other countries. Oportunidades makes education possible for children who 
would otherwise be kept at home to work by making cash payments to families whose 
children regularly attend school. Payments are also used to encourage other salutary 
behaviors, such as visits to health clinics. As of 2006, around one-quarter of Mexico’s 
population—some 27 million people—was participating in Oportunidades. If Mexico’s 
government could reduce by half the costs it incurs from pretrial detention, it would 
save enough to reach nearly another two million people through this program. 
As seen in Table 2, the overall annual cost per average detainee is 107,200 pesos 
or approximately US$11,000. This translates to a cost of 63,600 pesos to the state, 
21,800 pesos to the detainee, 21,000 pesos to the detainee’s family, and 800 pesos to 
the community.
TABLE 2




Cost to detainee’s family




10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
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Costly Confinement excludes a number of cost variables because of a lack of reliable 
data, resulting in an inherently conservative cost estimate. Cost variables for which data 
was unavailable include the following:
• psychological costs incurred by detainees (and their families) as a result of being 
detained in overcrowded, violent, and abusive conditions, especially for detainees 
who are eventually acquitted of the charges against them
• loss of employment opportunities for detainees because of the possible inter-
ruption of on-the-job trainings and studies (some 60 percent of all prisoners in 
Mexico are between the ages of 16 and 30 years of age) or because of the social 
stigma of detention
• cost to detainees’ families and communities of communicable diseases transmit-
ted by detainees infected while in detention
• costs associated with the planning, design, and construction of detention facilities.





For those seeking to reduce the excessive use of pretrial detention and ensure its ratio-
nal and legal use when it is appropriate, a wide array of international and regional 
conventions, resolutions, and other guidelines offer standards and guidance. Some of 
these instruments establish the rights of individuals held in pretrial detention—from 
the right to liberty and the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention, to the rights of 
detainees to have access to counsel and to family members. Others articulate the obliga-
tions of States concerning pretrial detention and set forth principles for the administra-
tion of pretrial detention.
International human rights treaties emphasize the important distinction between 
people who have been found guilty, convicted by a court of law, and sentenced to prison, 
and those who have not. Persons awaiting trial or the outcome of their trial are regarded 
differently because the law sees them as innocent until proven guilty. Underpinning 
the legal considerations of the applicability of pretrial detention are the right to liberty 
and the presumption of innocence.
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states that:
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly 
before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the 
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release 
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial.87
International standards permit detention before trial under certain, limited cir-
cumstances only. In 1990 the Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and Treatment of Offenders established the following principle:
Pretrial detention may be ordered only if there are reasonable grounds to believe 
that the persons concerned have been involved in the commission of the alleged 
offences and there is a danger of their absconding or committing further serious 
offences, or a danger that the course of justice will be seriously interfered with 
if they are let free.88
One of the major achievements of the Eighth UN Congress was the adoption, 
by consensus, of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the 
“Tokyo Rules”). In particular, these rules provide that:89
• pretrial detention shall be used as a means of last resort in criminal proceedings, 
with due regard for the investigation of the alleged offence and for the protection 
of society and the victim;
• alternatives to pretrial detention shall be employed at as early a stage as possible;
• pretrial detention shall last no longer than necessary and shall be administered 
humanely and with respect for the inherent dignity of human beings; and
• the offender shall have the right to appeal to a judicial or other competent inde-
pendent authority in cases where pretrial detention is employed.
According to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, detention before 
trial should be used only where it is lawful, reasonable and necessary. Detention may 
be necessary “to prevent flight, interference with evidence or the recurrence of crime,” 
or “where the person concerned constitutes a clear and serious threat to society which 
cannot be contained in any other manner.”90
The UN Human Rights Committee has also ruled that detention cannot be arbi-
trary: “The notion of ‘arbitrariness’ is not to be equated with ‘against the law,’ but must 
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be interpreted more broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of 
predictability and due process of law.”91 As a result, pretrial detention “must not only 
be lawful but reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances.”92
Not all standards carry equal legal weight. Some legal instruments (such as con-
ventions) create binding obligations on signatory states, while others (such as declara-
tions and resolutions) reflect broad agreement as to applicable norms of conduct or 
aspirations for future measures. Still other instruments (such as codes of conduct or 
bodies of principles) provide non-binding but persuasive and often highly specific guid-
ance as to how states may ensure the fair administration of justice and observance of 
individual rights. Whatever their weight as a matter of national or international law, 
these instruments and the standards they contain demonstrate a strong international 
consensus to protect the dignity and rights of individuals in pretrial detention.
The following resources collect and discuss international and regional standards 
applicable to pretrial detention, as well as related jurisprudence and commentary:
• Centre for Human Rights, Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch, Human 
Rights and Pre-trial Detention: A Handbook of International Standards Relating to 
Pre-trial Detention (1994).
• Amnesty International, Fair Trials Manual (1998).
• Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe, Pre-trial Detention in the 
OSCE Area (1999).
• Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, What Is a Fair Trial? A Basic Guide to Legal 
Standards and Practice (2000).
• Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Training Manual on Human 
Rights Monitoring (2001).
• Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in cooperation with the 
International Bar Association, Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A 
Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers (2003).
• UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Selected Documents Relating to Detention 
(2009).
• Irish Penal Reform Trust, Detention of Children in Ireland: International Standards 
and Best Practice (2009).
• International Network to Promote the Rule of Law, International Standards that 
relate to Detentions, Corrections, and Prisons (2010).
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Approximately 10 million people per year pass through pretrial 
detention; many of them will spend months or even years behind 
bars—without being tried or found guilty. The socioeconomic impact 
of this practice is staggering. Locking away millions of people who 
are presumed innocent is a violation of international norms and a 
waste of human potential that undermines development. 
The costs of excessive pretrial detention are paid not only by the 
detainees, but also by their families, communities, and states. Pretrial 
detainees may lose their jobs, be forced to sell their possessions, and 
be evicted from their homes. Their families suffer from lost income 
and forfeited opportunities, including a multi-generational effect in 
which detainees’ children suffer lower lifetime income. And the ripple 
effect does not stop there: the overuse of pretrial detention thwarts 
economic development, wastes state resources, and limits policy 
options.
This groundbreaking study attempts for the first time to count the 
full cost of excessive pretrial detention, including lost employment, 
stunted economic growth, the spread of disease and corruption, 
and the misuse of state resources. Combining statistics, personal 
accounts, and recommendations for reform, The Socioeconomic 
Impact of Pretrial Detention should be of interest to anyone concerned 
with poverty, human rights, and development. 
